国际政治科学

参考文献

(1)Daina Beth Solomon,“Thousands of Mexicans March to Scrap NAFTA, As Government Fights to Save It,” Reuters, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/thousands-of-mexicans-march-to-scrap-nafta-as-government-fights-to-save-it-id USK CN1AX0DC/,访问时间:2022年12月20日。

(2)Jessie Yeung,“Farmers Across India Have Been Protesting for Months. Here's Why,” CNN, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/10/asia/india-farmers-protestexplainer-intl-hnk-scli,访问时间:2022年12月21日。

(3)Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham,“Understanding Nonviolent Resistance:An Introduction,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.50, No.3,2013, pp.271-276; Suveyda Karakaya,“Globalization and Contentious Politics:A Comparative Analysis of Nonviolent and Violent Campaign,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.35, No.4, 2016, pp.315-335; Darin Christensen,“Concession Stands:How Mining Investments Incite Protest in Africa,” International Organization,Vol.73, No.1, 2019, pp.65-101.

(1)Wolfgang F.Stolper and Paul A.Samuelson,“Protection and Real Wages,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 1941, pp.58-73; Ronald Rogowski,Commerce and Coalitions:How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1989, p.69.

(2)Daron Acemoglu and James A.Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.15; Margit Bussmann and Gerald Schneider,“When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent:Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.51,No.1, 2007, pp.79-97; John S.Ahlquist and Erik Wibbels,“Riding the Wave:World Trade and Factor-Based Models of Democratization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.56, No.2, 2012, pp.447-464; Charles Hankla and Daniel Kuthy,“Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes:Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.57, No.3, 2013, pp.492-504; Wu Wen-Chin,“When do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol.59, No.4, 2015, pp.790-801.

(3)Elhanan Helpman,“Globalization and Wage Inequality,” Journal of the British Academy, Vol.5, 2017, pp.125-162; Nina Pavcnik,“The Impact of Trade on Inequality in Developing Countries,” NBER working paper 23878, 2017, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working＿papers/w23878/w23878.pdf.

(4)Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik,“Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.45,No.1, 2007, pp.39-82.

(1)世界银行:《2020年世界发展报告:在全球价值链时代以贸易促发展》,2020,https://www.rfilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2020-nian-shi-jie-fa-zhan-bao-gaozai-quan-qiu-jia-zhi-lian.pdf,访问时间:2023年4月15日。

(2)在贸易开放的宏观背景下,利益受损的发展中国家的非贸易行业通常指那些在面对进口商品竞争、市场开放以及国际化带来的多重压力时,处于不利地位,且无法有效适应全球竞争的行业及企业。这些行业和企业的主要特征包括高度依赖政府保护、技术水平较低、生产规模较小、创新能力薄弱、生产方式较为传统,以及在全球市场中无法达到国际竞争标准或应对全球竞争压力、主要从事国内市场和区域市场。这类企业通常难以有效应对外部市场的竞争挑战,导致其市场份额逐渐萎缩,生存压力不断增加。具体讨论详见Marc J.Melitz,“The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, Vol.71, No.6, 2003, pp.1695-1725;Amit K.Khandelwal, Peter K.Schott and Shang-Jin Wei,“Trade Liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform:Evidence from Chinese Exporters,” American Economic Review, Vol.103, No.6, 2013, pp.2169-2195.

(1)Wu,“When do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes?” pp.790-801;Eric CC Chang and Wen-Chin Wu,“Preferential Trade Agreements, Income Inequality,and Authoritarian Survival,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol.69, No.2, 2016, p.281-294; Daehee Bak and Chungshik Moon,“Foreign Direct Investment and Authoritarian Stability,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.49, No.14, 2016, pp.1998-2037.

(2)Goldberg, Koujianou and Pavcnik,“Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries,” pp.39-82; Irene Menéndez González, Erica Owen and Stefanie Walter,“Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers:The Distributive Effects of Trade in Emerging and Developing Countries,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.56, No.11,2023, pp.1724-1759;Iain Osgood, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim,Helen V.Milner and Gabriele Spilker,“The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters:Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy,” The Journal of Politics Vol.79, No.1,2017, pp.133-152;黄平、李奇泽:《经济全球化、金融资源占有与居民财富不平等》,载《国外社会科学》,2020年第3期,第44—59页;郑宇:《超级企业与全球不平等》,载《文化纵横》,2023年第2期,第136—145页。

(1)Stefanie Walter,“Globalization and the Welfare State:Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.54,No.2, 2010, pp.403-426; Yotam Margalit,“Costly Jobs:Trade-Related Layoffs,Government Compensation, and Voting in US Elections,” American Political Science Review, Vol.105, No.1, 2011, pp.166-188; David Dorn and Gordon H Hanson,“The China Syndrome:Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” American Economic Review, Vol.103, No.6, 2013, pp.2121-2168; Erica Owen and Noel P.Johnston,“Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade:Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment,” International Organization,Vol.71, No.4, 2017, pp.665-699.

(2)本文侧重研究发展中国家的贸易开放程度及其对国内社会稳定的影响。经济全球化指的是全球范围内各国经济相互依赖和联系的程度不断加深。它包括资本、劳动力、商品、技术、信息和服务等资源的跨国流动,导致国家间的生产、消费和市场联系更加紧密。经济全球化不仅涉及贸易,还包括金融市场、跨国公司、技术转移、文化交流等多个方面。贸易开放主要关注的是进出口商品和服务的自由流动,目的在于提高市场效率、推动经济增长,并通过更广泛的国际市场实现资源的最佳配置。总结来说,经济全球化是一个更为广泛和深远的过程,而贸易开放是其中一个重要的组成部分,两者相辅相成,但范围和重点有所不同。此外,在本文的稳健性检验部分,为了进一步区分贸易开放程度与国家的贸易开放政策或者国际经济组织的参与程度,表11模型14控制了GATT/WTO成员国的影响。

(3)唐睿、王彦维:《贸易依赖、政体类型和对华外交立场》,载《国际政治科学》,2023年第4期,第53—90页;杨攻研、毕胜:《政党、国家能力与经济兴衰——来自东亚与东南亚经济体的启示》,载《世界经济与政治》,2023年第7期,第104—126页。

(4)Murdie Amanda and Tavishi Bhasin,“Aiding and Abetting:Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.55, No.2,2011, pp.163-191; Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder,“Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.61,No.2, 2016, pp.298-324.

(1)田野、曹倩:《国际贸易、要素禀赋与政体类型的变迁——一个基于阶级均势的分析框架》,载《世界经济与政治》,2016年第2期,第4—35页;田野等:《国际贸易、初始威权类型与民主转型》,载《世界经济与政治》,2017第5期,第96—125页;Wu,“When do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries,” pp.790-801.

(2)Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny,“Economic Globalization and Democracy:An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol.33, No.1, 2003, pp.29-54; Nita Rudra and Stephan Haggard,“Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38, No.9,2005, pp.1015-1049; Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang,“Democracy and Globalization,”Economics&Politics, Vol.20, No.3, 2008, pp.289-334.

(3)Graeme B Robertson and Emmanuel Teitelbaum,“Foreign Direct Investment,Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.55, No.3, 2011, pp.665-677; Bak and Moon,“Foreign Direct Investment and Authoritarian Stability,” pp.1998-2037.

(4)Havard Hegre,“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816—1992,” American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.1,2002, pp.33-48; James D.Fearon and David D.Laitin,“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2003, pp.75-90.

(1)James Raymond Vreeland,“The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.52, No.3, 2008, pp.401-425.

(2)Jack Goldstone, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B.Lustik, Monty G.Marshall, Jay Ulfelder and Mark Woodward,“A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.54, No.1,2010, pp.190-208; Drew Bowlsby, Erica Chenoweth, Cullen Hendrix and Jonathan D.Moyer,“The Future is a Moving Target:Predicting Political Instability,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.4, 2019, pp.1405-1417.

(3)Steven Levitsky and Lucan A.Way, Competitive Authoritarianism:Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.124.

(4)Robert C.Feenstra and Gordon H.Hanson,“Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality,” The American Economic Review, Vol.86, No.2, 1996, pp.240-45;Robert C.Feenstra and Gordon H.Hanson,“Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages:Evidence from Mexico's Maquiladoras,” Journal of International Economics,Vol.42, No.3-4, 1997, pp.371-393; Elhanan Helpman, Understanding Global Trade,Boston:Harvard University Press, 2011, p.99; Marc J.Melitz&Daniel Trefler,“Gains from Trade When Firms Matter,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.26, No.2,2012, pp.91-118.

(5)Leonardo Baccini, Pablo M.Pinto and Stephen Weymouth,“The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization:Firm-Level Evidence,” International Organization, Vol.71, No.2, 2017, pp.373-395; Kim In Song and Iain Osgood,“Firms in Trade and Trade Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.22, 2019,pp.399-417.

(1)David Hummels, Jun Ishii and Kei-Mu Yi,“The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade,” Journal of International Economics, Vol.54, No.1,2001, pp.75-96.

(2)Wei Wang, Ryan Kennedy, David Lazer and Naren Ramakrishnan,“Growing Pains for Global Monitoring of Societal Events,” Science, Vol.353, No.6307, 2016,pp.1502-1503.

(3)Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1970,p.10; Maria T.Grasso and Marco Giugni,“Protest Participation and Economic Crisis:The Conditioning Role of Political Opportunities,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol.55, No.4, 2016, pp.663-680; Thomas Kurer, Silja Hausermann, Bruno Wuest and Matthias Enggist,“Economic Grievances and Political Protest,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol.58, No.3, 2019, pp.866-892.

(4)积怨理论认为,社会冲突源于群体对不公正处境的主观感知与相对剥夺感,这种心理积怨在结构性不公催化下可能引发集体行动,Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Chapter 1.

(1)Elena Meschi and Marco Vivarelli,“Trade and Income Inequality in Developing Countries,” World Development, Vol.37, No.2, 2009, pp.287-302; Li Zheng and Ling Zhu.“Trade Openness, Job Sectors, and Social Policy Preferences:Evidence from China,” Political Science Research and Methods, Vol.11, No.3, 2023, pp.613-622.

(2)Stolper and Samuelson,“Protection and Real Wages,” pp.58-73; Rogowski,Commerce and Coalitions, p.127.

(3)Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik,“Why Are Some People(and Countries)More Protectionist than Others?” European Economic Review, Vol.49, No.6, 2005,pp.1393-1430.

(4)竺波亮:《地缘政治竞争和全球价值链》,载《国际政治研究》,2024第3期,第59—60页;Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence:Information Technology and the New Globalization, Harvard University Press, 2016, p.90.

(1)Eunyoung Ha,“Globalization, Government Ideology, and Income Inequality in Developing Countries,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.74, No.2, 2012, pp.541-557;余淼杰、黑烨:《国际贸易与收入不平等研究》,载《长安大学学报(社会科学版)》,2019第2期,第10页;González, Owen and Walter,“Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers,”pp.1724-1759.

(2)Feenstra and Hanson,“Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages,” pp.371-393; Andrea Conte and Marco Vivarelli,“Globalization and Employment:Imported Skill Biased Technological Change in Developing Countries,” IZA Discussion Papers 2797,Institute for the Study of Labor(IZA), 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract＿id=993480,访问时间:2023年5月9日。

(3)郑宇、叶子:《发展中国家的开放韧性——基于全球价值链的视角》,载《世界经济与政治》,2024年第1期,第38—70页。

(1)Robert C.Johnson and Guillermo Noguera,“Accounting for Intermediates:Production Sharing and Trade in Value Added,” Journal of International Economics,Vol.86, No.2, 2012, pp.224-236;王直、魏尚进、祝坤福:《总贸易核算法:官方贸易统计与全球价值链的度量》,载《中国社会科学》,2015第9期,第108—127页;张宇燕主编:《世界经济黄皮书:2020年世界经济形势分析与预测》,社会科学文献出版社2020年版。

(2)郑宇:《超级企业与全球不平等》,第136—145页。

(3)Jakob Roland Munch and Jan Rose Skaksen,“Human Capital and Wages in Exporting Firms,” Journal of International Economics, Vol.75, No.2, 2008, pp.363-372.

(4)David Atkin, Amit K Khandelwal and Adam Osman,“Exporting and Firm Performance:Evidence From a Randomized Experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.132, No.2, 2017, pp.551-615.

(5)Kim and Osgood,“Firms in Trade and Trade Politics,” pp.399-417.

(1)Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci,“Special Economic Zones:Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions,” The World Bank, 2011, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/49cdd96b-37e1-50f0-ac30-7328b9f5a1f1,访问时间:2022年12月26日。

(2)Tabea Palmtag, Tobias Rommel and Stefanie Walter,“International Trade and Public Protest:Evidence from Russian Regions,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.64,No.4, 2020, pp.939-955.

(1)Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.12.

(2)John Kennan and Robert Wilson,“Bargaining with Private Information,”Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.31, No.1, 1993, pp.45-104.

(1)The Integrated Crisis Early Warning System(ICEWS), https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/research-labs/advanced-technology-labs/icews.html;Arthur Banks, Cross-national time-series data archive(CNTS):1815—2022, 2022,https://www.cntsdata.com/,访问时间:2026年1月28日。

(2)Philip Schrodt,“CAMEO:Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event and Actor Codebook,” Pennsylvania State University, 2012, http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf,访问时间:2022年12月26日。

(1)https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators,访问时间:2026年1月28日。

(1)Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Christian Davenport and Keith Jaggers,“Polity IV, 1800—1999:Comments on Munck and Verkuilen,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.35, No.1, 2002, pp.40-45。本研究“制度开放”变量对应Polity数据库中的POLCOMP指标,用于衡量政治制度的竞争性参与程度。

(2)Vreeland,“The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War,” pp.401-425;Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Gurr, Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder and Woodward,“A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” pp.190-208.

(1)Michael L.Ross,“What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?”Journal of Peace Research, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, pp.337-356; Michael L.Ross,“What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.18,No.1, 2015, pp.239-259.

(2)Chenoweth and Ulfelder,“Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?” pp.298-324.

(1)Edward D.Mansfield, Helen V.Milner and B.Peter Rosendorff,“Free to Trade:Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade,” American Political Science Review, Vol.94, No.2, 2000, pp.305-321; Michael Tomz, Judith L.Goldstein and Douglas Rivers,“Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment,”American Economic Review, Vol.97, No.5, 2007, pp.2005-2018; Wilfred Ming Chow and Daniel Yuichi Kono,“Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy:Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.61, No.4, 2017, pp.892-906.

(2)Eichengreen and Leblang,“Democracy and Globalization,” pp.289-334.

(1)统计附录表1A中展示分别使用普通最小二乘法、国家固定效应模型和面板固定效应模型的结果。

(1)Palmtag, Rommel and Walter,“International Trade and Public Protest,”pp.939-955.

(2)萨缪尔·亨廷顿著、王冠华等译:《变革社会中的政治秩序》,上海人民出版社2021年版。

(3)Russell Dalton, Alix Van Sickle and Steven Weldon,“The IndividualInstitutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol.40,No.1, 2010, pp.51-73.

(1)Kurer, Hausermann, Wuest and Enggist,“Economic Grievances and Political Protest,” pp.866-892.

(2)Janet M.Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S.Jones, Event History Modeling:A Guide for Social Scientists, New York:Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.69-85.

(3)感谢匿名评审专家,推荐使用R软件中的glmm TMB包,它支持负二项分布,而且可以灵活加入国家和年度固定效应,极大提升了统计分析的精准度。

(1)Mehdi Shadmehr,“Mobilization, Repression, and Revolution:Grievances and Opportunities in Contentious Politics,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.76, No.3, 2014,pp.621-635; Christensen,“Concession Stands,” pp.65-101.

(2)Kurer, Hausermann, Wuest and Enggist,“Economic Grievances and Political Protest,” pp.866-892.

(3)Frederick Solt,“Economic Inequality and Nonviolent Protest,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol.96, No.5, 2015, pp.1314-1327.

(4)Chang and Wu,“Preferential Trade Agreements, Income Inequality, and Authoritarian Survival,” pp.281-294.

(1)Goldberg and Pavcnik,“Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries,” pp.39-82.

(2)Frederick Solt,“Measuring Income Inequality across Countries and Over Time:The Standardized World Income Inequality Database,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol.101,No.3, 2020, pp.1183-1199.

(1)Kosuke Imai, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley and Teppei Yamamoto,“Unpacking the Black Box of Causality:Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies,” American Political Science Review, Vol.105, No.4, 2011,pp.765-789; Dustin Tingley et al.,“Mediation:R package for Causal Mediation Analysis,” Journal of Statistical Software, Vol.59, No.5, 2014, pp.1-38.

(1)漆海霞:《混合方法:当前国际关系研究的可行选择》,载《国际政治科学》,2023年第1期,第4—7页。

(2)美国总统特朗普在竞选期间大肆抨击该协议,承诺重新谈判该协议,并在美国无法获得所期望的让步时“撕毁”该协议。2020年,经过重新谈判的《美国—墨西哥—加拿大协议》(USMCA)获得批准,以更新《北美自由贸易协定》。

(1)Cirila Quintero Ramírez and Paolo Marinaro,“The Remaking of the Mexican Labor Movement in the Automotive Industry,” Journal of Labor and Society, Vol.22,No.1, 2019, pp.9-23.

(2)González, Owen and Walter,“Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers,”pp.1724-1759.

(1)The National Council of the Maquiladora and Manufacturing Export Industry(INDEX),https://index.org.mx/#Acerca%20de%20Index,访问时间:2024年12月16日。

(2)“Thousands of Workers Strike in Mexico for Better Pay,” Peoples Dispatch,https://peoplesdispatch.org/2019/02/19/thousands-of-workers-strike-in-mexico-for-betterpay/,访问时间:2024年12月16日。

(1)郑宇、叶子:《发展中国家的开放韧性——基于全球价值链的视角》,第38—70页。

(2)Bruno Casella et al.,“Improving the Analysis of Global Value Chains:the UNCTAD-Eora Database,” Transnational Corporations Journal, Vol.26, No.3, 2019.

(1)Fearon and Laitin,“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” pp.75-90.

(2)Chenoweth and Ulfelder,“Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?” pp.298-324.

(1)Seraphine F.Maerz et al.,“Vdemdata:An R Package to Load, Explore and Work with the Most Recent V-Dem(Varieties of Democracy)Dataset,” 2024, https://github.com/vdeminstitute/vdemdata,访问时间:2025年12月29日。民主问责指数囊括了包括横向与纵向的多个具体问责维度,与政权5数据库的政治开放指数(POLCOMP)具有一定的重合性,但是概念覆盖面更广。

(1)徐秀军:《制度型开放与“再全球化”的政治经济学》,载《国际政治研究》,2024第1期,第7页。

(1)《习近平外交思想学习问答》,人民出版社2023年版,第210—221页。