国际政治科学

参考文献

(1)详见SEC官网:“SEC Publishes Annual Staff Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,” February 2nd, 2023, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-21,访问时间:2024年8月3日。

(2)Alexander W.Butler and Larry Fauver,“Institutional Environment and Sovereign Credit Ratings,” Financial Management, Vol.34, No.3, 2006, pp.53-79;Hüseyin?ztürk,“The Origin of Bias in Sovereign Credit Ratings:Reconciling Agency views with Institutional Quality,” The Journal of Development Areas, Vol.48, No.4,2014, pp.161-188;Orhan Erdem and Yusuf Varli,“Understanding the Sovereign Credit Ratings of Emerging Markets,” Emerging Markets Review, Vol.20, No.9, 2014,pp.42-57;Periklis Boumparis, Costas Milas and Theodore Panagiotidis,“Economic Policy Uncertainty and Sovereign Credit Rating Decisions:Panel Quantile Evidence for the Eurozone,”Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol.79, No.12, 2017, pp.39-71.

(3)例如,2023年8月1日惠誉下调美国主权信用评级的原因之一就是美国的政府治理不断恶化。又如,英国脱欧导致标普在2016年将英国的主权信用评级从AAA下调至AA,且维持至今。

(1)Richard Cantor and Frank Packer,“Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings,” Economic Policy Review, Vol.2, No.2, 1996;Nada Mora,“Sovereign Credit Ratings:Guilty beyond Reasonable Doubt?” Journal of Banking&Finance,Vol.30, No.7, 2006, pp.2041-2062;António Afonso, Pedro Gomes and Philipp Rother,“What‘hides’ behind Sovereign Debt Ratings?” ECB Working Paper Series, No.711,2007,pp.1-62;António Afonso, Pedro Gomes and Philipp Rother,“Short-and Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings,” International Journal of Finance&Economics, Vol.16, No.1, 2011, pp.1-15;那明:《金融危机背景下国家主权信用评级影响因素分析——基于27个OECD国家面板数据的研究》,载《世界经济研究》,2014年第10期,第28—33+88页。

(2)Derya Gültekin-Karaka?, Mehtap Hisarc?kl?lar and Hüseyin?ztürk,“Sovereign Risk Ratings:Biased toward Developed Countries?” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol.47,No.SUPPL.2, 2011, pp.69-87;杨胜刚、成程:《中国的主权信用评级是否被低估?》,载《国际金融研究》,2011年第7期,第59—66页;苏民:《中国主权信用评级被低估了吗?:基于面板线性与有序概率回归方法》,载《世界经济研究》,2017年第11期,第121—134+137页。

(1)Sorin Alexe, Peter L.Hammer and Alexander Kogan, et al.,“A Non-recursive Regression Model for Country Risk Rating,” RUTCOR-Rutgers University Research Report RRR, No.9, 2003, pp.1-40; Julia A.Bennell, David Crabbe and Stephen Thomas, et al.,“Modelling Sovereign Credit Ratings:Neural Networks versus Ordered Probit,” Expert Systems with Applications, Vol.30, No.3, 2006, pp.415-425;Gültekin-Karaka?, Hisarc?kl?lar and?ztürk,“Sovereign Risk Ratings:Biased toward Developed Countries?” pp.69-87;Afonso, Gomes and Rother,“Short-and Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings,” pp.1-15;那明:《金融危机背景下国家主权信用评级影响因素分析——基于27个OECD国家面板数据的研究》,第28—33+88页。

(2)Butler and Fauver,“Institutional Environment and Sovereign Credit Ratings,”pp.53-79;?ztürk,“The Origin of Bias in Sovereign Credit Ratings:Reconciling Agency views with Institutional Quality,” pp.161-188;Erdem and Varli,“Understanding the Sovereign Credit Ratings of Emerging Markets,” pp.42-57.

(3)Kenneth A.Schultz and Barry R.Weingast,“The Democratic Advantage:Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition,” International Organization, Vol 57, No.1, 2003, pp.3-42; Candace C. Archer, Glen Biglaiser and Karl De Rouen,“Sovereign Bonds and the‘Democratic Advantage’:Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World?” International Organization, Vol.61, No.2, 2007, pp.341-365; Emily Beaulieu, Gary W.Cox and Sebastian Saiegh,“Sovereign Debt and Regime Type:Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage,” International Organization, Vol 66, No.4, 2012, pp.709-738.

(1)Glen Biglaiser and Joseph L.Staats,“Finding the‘Democratic Advantage’ in Sovereign Bond Ratings:The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection,and the Rule of Law,” International Organization, Vol 66, No.3, 2012, pp.515-535.

(2)Steven A.Block and Paul M.Vaaler,“The Price of Democracy:Sovereign Risk Ratings, Bond Spreads and Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol 23, No.6, 2004, pp.917-946; Paul M.Vaaler, Burkhard N.Schrage and Steven A.Block,“Elections, Opportunism,Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries,” Review of Development Economics, Vol 10, No.1, 2006, pp.154-170.

(3)Zsofi Barta and Alison Johnston,“Rating Politics? Partisan Discrimination in Credit Ratings in Developed economies,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.51, No.5,2018, pp.587-620.

(4)Gültekin-Karaka?, Hisarc?kl?lar and?ztürk,“Sovereign Risk Ratings:Biased toward Developed Countries?” pp.69-87.

(1)Giovanni Ferri,“More Analysts, Better Ratings:Do Rating Agencies Invest Enough in Less Developed Countries?” Journal of Applied Economics, Vol 7, No.1,2004, pp.77-98; David F.Tennant, Marlon R.Tracey and Damien W.King,“Sovereign Credit Rating:Evidence of Bias against Poor Countries,” The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol.51, No.1, 2020, pp.1-13.

(2)Oussama Ben Hmiden, Didier Tatoutchoup and Pierre Nguimkeu, et al.,“Discrepancy and Cross-Regional Bias in Sovereign Credit Ratings:Analyzing the Role of Public Debt,” Economic Modelling, Vol.131, No.2, 2024, pp.1-13.

(3)杨胜刚、成程:《中国的主权信用评级是否被低估?》,载《国际金融研究》,2011年第7期,第59—66页。

(4)苏民:《中国主权信用评级被低估了吗?:基于面板线性与有序概率回归方法》,载《世界经济研究》,2017年第11期,第121—134+137页。

(5)Simon Kuznets and John Thomas Murphy, Modern Economic Growth:Rate,Structure, and Spread, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1966.

(6)Alberto Alesina, Sule?zler and Nouriel Roubini, et al.,“Political Instability and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic growth, Vol.1, No.2, 1996, pp.189-211;Nauro F.Campos and Jeffrey B.Nugent,“Investment and Instability,” 2000;Richard J.Cebula,“Economic Growth, Ten Forms of Economic Freedom, and Political Stability:An Empirical Study Using Panel Data, 2003—2007,” Journal of Private Enterprise,Vol.26, No.1, 2011, pp.61-81;Henryk Gurgul and?ukasz Lach,“Political Instability and Economic Growth:Evidence from Two Decades of Transition in CEE,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.46, No.2, 2013, pp.189-202;张中元:《论全球化、政治稳定性对经济增长的影响》,载《世界经济与政治》,2014年第4期,第136—155+160页。

(1)Ari Aisen and Francisco J.Veiga,“How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.29, No.3, 2013, pp.151-167.

(2)彭红枫、谭小玉、祝小全:《货币国际化:基于成本渠道的影响因素和作用路径研究》,载《世界经济》,2017年第11期,第120—143页。

(3)Jane Helleiner,“‘Over the River’ Border Childhoods and Border Crossings at Niagara,” Childhood, Vol.14, No.4, 2007, pp.431-447;张冲、杨洁、张明:《政治稳定性影响货币国际化的机制研究》,载《世界经济与政治》,2023年第3期,第32—57+156—157页。

(4)Butler and Fauver,“Institutional Environment and Sovereign Credit Ratings,”pp.53-79;Ozturk,“The Origin of Bias in Sovereign Credit Ratings:Reconciling Agency views with Institutional Quality,” pp.161-188;Erdem and Varli,“Understanding the Sovereign Credit Ratings of Emerging Markets,” pp.42-57;Boumparis, Milas and Panagiotidis,“Economic Policy Uncertainty and Sovereign Credit Rating Decisions:Panel Quantile Evidence for the Eurozone,” pp.39-71.

(1)Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, et al.,“Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms:Volatility, Crises and Growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.50, No.1, 2003, pp.49-123.

(2)James E.Anderson and Dominique Marcouiller,“Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade:An Empirical Investigation,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.84, No.2,2002, pp.342-352.

(3)Ozturk,“The Origin of Bias in Sovereign Credit Ratings:Reconciling Agency views with Institutional Quality,” pp.161-188.

(4)杨攻研、刘聪:《国家间政治、相互依赖武器化与中国供应链安全——来自微观企业的经验证据》,载《当代亚太》,2024年第5期,第28—54+161—162页。

(1)杨攻研、刘洪钟:《政治关系、经济权力与贸易往来:来自东亚的证据》,载《世界经济与政治》,2015年第12期,第110—130页;杨连星、刘晓光、张杰:《双边政治关系如何影响对外直接投资——基于二元边际和投资成败视角》,载《中国工业经济》,2016年第11期,第56—72页。(2)“母国”指机构总部所在的经济体。如果评级机构在其他条件相同的情况下,对其母国或与其存在密切经济、政治和文化联系的经济体给予较高评级,我们将其称为主权信用评级中的“母国偏见”。

(1)Lieven De Moor, Prabesh Luitel and Piet Sercu, et al.,“Subjectivity in Sovereign Credit Ratings,” Journal of Banking&Finance, Vol.88, No.33, 2018, pp.366-392.

(2)Layna Mosley,“Room to Move:International Financial Markets and National Welfare States,” International Organization, Vol.54, No.4, 2000, pp.737-773; Layna Mosley,“Globalisation and the State:Still Room to Move?” New Political Economy,Vol.10, No.3, 2005, pp.355-362.

(3)Julia Gray,“International Organization as A Seal of Approval:European Union Accession and Investor Risk,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol 53, No.4,2009, pp.931-949; Sarah M.Brooks, Rodrigo Cunha and Layna Mosley,“Categories,Creditworthiness, and Contagion:How Investors'Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol 59, No.3, 2015, pp.587-601; Zolt'n Barta and Krisztina Makszin,“The Politics of Creditworthiness:Political and Policy Commentary in Sovereign Credit Rating Reports,” Journal of Public Policy, Vol.41,No.2, 2021, pp.307-330.

(1)Afonso, Gomes and Rother,“What‘hides’ Behind Sovereign Debt Ratings?”pp.1-62;Gültekin-Karaka?, Hisarc?kl?lar and?ztürk,“Sovereign Risk Ratings:Biased toward Developed Countries?” pp.69-87;Afonso, Gomes and Rother,“Short-and Longrun Determinants of Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings,” pp.1-15;那明:《金融危机背景下国家主权信用评级影响因素分析——基于27个OECD国家面板数据的研究》,第28—33+88页。

(1)Peter Reusens and Christophe Croux,“Sovereign Credit Rating Determinants:A Comparison Before and After the European Debt Crisis,” Journal of Banking&Finance, Vol.77, No.4, 2017, pp.108-121;De Moor, Luitel and Sercu, et al.,“Subjectivity in Sovereign Credit Ratings,” pp.366-392.

(2)短期发行人信用评级关注的是债务人在短期内履行其所有财务承诺的能力和意愿,标普可以分为A-1+、A-1、A-2、A-3、B、C以及SD和D共7个级别;穆迪有P-1、P-2、P-3以及NP共4个级别;而惠誉有F1+、F1、F2、F3、B、C、RD以及D共8个级别。

(1)Rasha Al-Sakka and Owain ap Gwilym,“Heterogeneity of Sovereign Rating Migrations in Emerging Countries,” Emerging Markets Review, Vol.10, No.2, 2009,pp.151-165.

(2)Christian E.Bannier and Christian W.Hirsch,“The Economic Function of Credit Rating Agencies—What Does the Watchlist Tell Us?” Journal of Banking&Finance, Vol.34, No.2, 2010, pp.3037-3049.

(1)Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig,“What Determines Chinese Outward FDI?”Journal of World Business, Vol.47, No.1, 2012, pp.26-34;Alberto Amighini, Roberta Rabellotti and Michele Sanfilippo,“China's Outward FDI:An Industry-level Analysis of Host-country Determinants,” Frontiers of Economics in China, Vol.8, No.3, 2013,pp.309-336;宗芳宇、路江涌、武常岐:《双边投资协定、制度环境和企业对外直接投资区位选择》,载《经济研究》,2012年第5期,第71—82+146页;Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi,“Governance Matters VIII:Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996—2008,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,No.4978, 2009.

(1)蒋冠宏、蒋殿春:《中国对外投资的区位选择:基于投资引力模型的面板数据检验》,载《世界经济》,2012年第9期,第21—40页;谢孟军:《政治风险对中国对外直接投资区位选择影响研究》,载《国际经贸探索》,2015年第9期,第66—80页;杜萌、马宇:《国家政治风险、人口老龄化与主权债务违约——来自新兴市场和发展中国家的证据》,载《国际金融研究》,2015年第1期,第37—47页。

(1)我们使用方差膨胀因子(VIF)法和相关系数法检验了核心解释变量与各控制变量之间的相关性,结果表明二者之间不存在严重的多重共线性问题。

(1)参见标普(www.standardandpoors.com)、穆迪(www.moodys.com)、惠誉(www.fitchratings.com)。

(2)参见世界银行(http://data.worldbank.org)。

(1)需要说明的是,由于不同的评级机构对不同经济体开始评级的时间不一致,并不是所有经济体在1996—2022年均有数据(如穆迪对乌克兰于1998年2月6日开始评级),因此本文经济体评级机构层面的数据并不完全覆盖1996—2022年(其中,剔除1997年、1999年和2001年的数据)。

(1)本文根据经济体的实际有效汇率指数计算其实际有效汇率波动。具体而言,对月度实际有效汇率指数取差分,并计算其年度的标准差,得到实际有效汇率波动。

(1)Peter Reusens and Christophe Croux,“Sovereign Credit Rating Determinants:A Comparison before and after the European Debt Crisis,” Journal of Banking&Finance, Vol.77, No.4, 2017, pp.108-121.