国际政治科学

参考文献

(1)在全球46个最不发达国家中占33个,参见联合国经济及社会理事会最不发达国家名单:https://www.un.org/zh/conferences/least-developed-countries,访问时间:2024年10月9日。

(2)下文将民族分离主义暴力冲突简称为分离冲突,民族分离主义组织简称为分离组织。

(3)Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War:Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2013,pp.24-28.中译本见安德烈亚斯·威默著、杨端程译:《战争之波:现代世界中的民族主义、国家形成与族群排斥》,格致出版社/上海人民出版社2023年版。

(4)曹正汉:《统治风险与地方分权——关于中国国家治理的三种理论及其比较》,载《社会》,2014年第6期,第52—69页。

(5)World Bank, Pathways for Peace:Inclusive approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, p.146; United States Agency for International Development(USAID),Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook, Washington, DC:USAID, 2009.

(1)Agnes Maillot,“Comrades in Arms:Sinn Féin and Basque Separatism,”Nordic Irish Studies, Vol.4, 2005:pp.1-12.

(2)Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset,“Introduction:What Makes for Democracy?” in Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset ,eds., Politics in Developing Countries:Comparing Experiences with Democracy,Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp.1-66; Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus States:Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Washington, D.C:United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.

(1)Charles M.Tiebout,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.64, No.5, 1956, pp.416-424.

(2)Philip G.Roeder,“Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics,Vol.43, No.2, 1991, pp.196-232; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed:Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1996; Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence:Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, New York, NY:W.Norman Company, 2000; Daniel Treisman, The Architecture of Government:Rethinking Political Decentralization, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2007.

(3)Barry Posen,“Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power,” International Security, Vol.18, No.2, 1993, pp.80-124.

(4)Stephen M.Saideman, David J.Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton,“Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict:A Pooled TimeSeries Analysis, 1985—1998,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.35, No.1, 2002,pp.103-129.

(5)David A.Lake and Donald Rothchild,“Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements,” in Philip G.Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace:Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2005,pp.109-132; Donald Rothchild and Philip G.Roeder,“Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies,” in Sustainable Peace:Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, pp.1-25.

(1)例如Henry Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics:Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2008;Snyder, From Voting to Violence; Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions:The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1999.

(2)Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian Min,“Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict:A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,” American Sociological Review, Vol.74, No.2, 2009, pp.316-337.

(3)Dawn Brancati,“Decentralization:Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?,” International Organization, Vol.60, No.3, 2006,pp.651-685.

(4)Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min,“Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis,” World Politics, Vol.62, No.1, 2010, pp.87-119;Lars-Erik Cederman, K.S.Gleditsch and H.Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2013; Nils-Christian Bormann et al.,“Power Sharing:Institutions, Behavior, and Peace,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.63, No.1, 2019, pp.84-100.

(5)Lars-erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Sch?del, and Julian Wucherpfennig,“Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict:Too Little, Too Late?” American Political Science Review, Vol.109, No.2, 2015, pp.354-370; Lars-Erik Cederman,Simon Hug and Julian Wucherpfennig, Sharing Power, Securing Peace?:Ethnic Inclusion and Civil War, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2022.

(1)Scott Gates, Benjamin A.T.Graham, Yonatan Lupu, H?vard Strand and Kaare W.Str?m,“Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.78,No.2, 2016, pp.512-526.

(2)Paulina Pospieszna and Gerald Schneider,“The Illusion of‘Peace Through Power-Sharing’:Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War,” Civil Wars, Vol.15,No.sup1, 2013, pp.44-70.

(3)谢超:《联邦制度与国内和平:浅析印度政府如何应对锡克教武装分离主义》,载《南亚研究》,2016年第4期,第76—100页。

(4)Andreas Juon,“Territorial Autonomy and the Trade-Off between Civil and Communal Violence,” American Political Science Review, Vol.119, No.1, 2025, pp.91-107.

(5)Joshua D.Angrist, Guido W.Imbens and Donald B.Rubin,“Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol.91, No.434, 1996, pp.444-455.

(6)Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin,“Computational Approaches to Conflict Research from Modeling and Data to Computational Diplomacy,” Journal of Computational Science, Vol.72, 2023, p.102112.

(1)例如Ian S.Lustick, Dan Miodownik and Roy J.Eidelson,“Secessionism in Multicultural States:Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?” The American Political Science Review, Vol.98, No.2, 2004, pp.209-229.

(2)例如Barry Posen,“The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael Brown ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1993, pp.103-124; James D.Fearon and David D.Laitin,“Ethnicity,Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol.97, No.1, 2003,pp.75-90; Roger Dale Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence:Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2002; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.56, No.4, 2004, pp.563-595; Barbara F.Walter,“Building Reputation:Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,”American Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.313-330.

(3)例如Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2011; Fotini Christia,Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2012;Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Inside the Politics of Self-Determination, Oxford,UK:Oxford University Press, 2014; Peter Krause, Rebel Power:Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2017;Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion:Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse,Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2014; Stathis N.Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher,“How‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?:Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics, Vol.59, No.2, 2007, pp.177-216; Jacob N.Shapiro, The Terrorist■■s Dilemma:Managing Violent Covert Organizations,Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2013, p.10; Jori Breslawski and Brandon Ives,“Killing for God? Factional Violence on the Transnational Stage,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.63, No.3, 2019, pp.617-643.

(1)Krause, Rebel Power.

(2)Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement.

(3)Evan Perkoski, Divided Not Conquered:How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave, Oxford, UK:Oxford University, 2022, p.38.

(4)David E.Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan,“It Takes Two:A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No.4, 2009, pp.570-597.

(5)David E.Cunningham,“Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.4, 2006, pp.875-892.

(6)Cunningham, Inside the Politics of Self-Determination.

(7)David E.Cunningham, Barriers to Peace in Civil War, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2011; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham,“Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede:How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?” American Political Science Review, Vol.105, No.2, 2011, pp.275-297.

(8)Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M.Bakke and Lee J.M.Seymour,“Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow:Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in SelfDetermination Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.56, No.1, 2012, pp.67-93.

(9)薛松:《分权与族群分离运动:基于印尼的分析》,载《国际政治科学》,2019年第4期,第157—188页。■■■■■■夏方波、陈琪:《双重整合博弈与分离主义运动的进程性模式分异》,载《世界经济与政治》,2022年第6期,第80—106页。

(1)Allard Duursma and Feike Fliervoet,“Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.65, No.4, 2021, pp.788-812.

(2)Cunningham, Inside the Politics of Self-Determination; Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson,“The Rise of Rebel Contenders:Barriers to Entry and Fragmentation in Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.55, No.5, 2018, pp.551-565; Lee JM Seymour, Kristin M.Bakke and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham,“E Pluribus Unum, Ex Uno Plures:Competition, Violence and Fragmentation in Ethnopolitical Movements,”Journal of Peace Research, Vol.53, No.1, 2016, pp.3-18.

(3)例如Livia Isabella Schubiger,“One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion,” International Organization, Vol.77, No.1, 2023, pp.33-64.Duursma and Fliervoet, Fueling Factionalism?

(4)Kristin M.Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Lee J.M.Seymour,“A Plague of Initials:Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol.10, No.2, 2012, pp.265-283.

(5)David E Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan,“It Takes Two:A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No.4, 2009, pp.570-597.

(1)Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York, NY:Mc Gaw-Hillr Publ, 1978.

(2)Anthony Oberschall,“Theories of Social Conflict,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.4, No.1, 1978, pp.291-315; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.

(3)在本文语境中,分离组织指的是民族主义运动中的激进派,下文对这两个术语视情况交叉使用。

(4)Cunningham et al.,“It Takes Two:A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” pp.570-597.

(1)巴斯克激进派政党/政治联盟数次更名,此处仅列其一。“人民团结”(Herri Batasuna, HB)成立于1978年, 1998年改名为“巴斯克公民”(Euskal Herritarrok),2001年改名为“团结”(Batasuna),2003年改名为“创造”(Sortu),之后2011年联合其他激进派政治力量组建“巴斯克地区联合”(Euskal Herria Bildu)参与巴斯克议会选举,目前稳居巴斯克议会第二大党。

(1)Tulia Falleti,“A Sequential Theory of Descentralization:Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.99, No.3,2005, pp.327-346.

(1)James D.Fearon,“Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization,Vol.49, No.3, 1995, pp.379-414.

(2)Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham,“Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining:How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.57, No.3, 2013, pp.659-672.

(3)James D.Fearon,“Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem,” Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, 1994, pp.2-5; James D.Fearon, Kimuli Kasara and David D.Laitin,“Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset,” American Political Science Review, Vol.101, No.1, 2007, pp.187-193; Caroline A.Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace:Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, University Park, PA:Pennsylvania State University Press,2007; Barbara F.Walter, Committing to Peace:The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2002.

(1)Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol,“Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,” Politics&Society, Vol.17, No.4, 1989, pp.489-509; Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT:Yale University Press,1968.

(2)叶成城、唐世平:《基于因果机制的案例选择方法》,载《世界经济与政治》,2019年第10期,第22—47页。周亦奇、唐世平:《“半负面案例比较法”与机制辨别——北约与华约的命运为何不同》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第12期,第32—59页。

(1)Nicholas Sambanis,“Power-Sharing and Peace-Building,” in Samir Makdisi and Raimundo Soto, eds., The Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, London, UK:Routledge,2023, pp.67-94.

(1)Barbara Walter, Reputation and Civil War:Why Separatist Conflicts are So Violent, Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2009.Philip G.Roeder,National Secession:Persuasion and Violence in Independence Campaigns, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 2018, p.124.

(2)Cunningham et al., It Takes Two:A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.

(3)Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt,“The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.46, No.10, 2013, pp.1301-1327.

(4)李捷、靳晓哲:《21世纪以来中国的分裂主义研究——李捷教授访谈》,载《国际政治研究》,2022年第6期,第131—156页。

(5)Liesbet Hooghe et al., Measuring Regional Authority:A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Oxford, UK:Oxford University Press, 2016; Arjan H.Schakel,“Validation of the Regional Authority Index,” Regional&Federal Studies, Vol.18, No.2-3,2008, pp.143-166; Jonathan Rodden,“Comparative Federalism and Decentralization:On Meaning and Measurement,” Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.4, 2004, pp.481-500.

(1)之所以说主导,是因为新教徒一方的暴力组织如阿尔斯特防卫协会(Ulster Defence Association)、阿尔斯特志愿军(Ulster Volunteer Force)等都是因应共和军而开展暴力活动的。共和军停火他们也很快停火了。其他的北爱民族主义武装如正式共和军(Official IRA)、爱尔兰民族解放军(Irish National Liberation Army)的暴力活动只占分离冲突中的很小一部分,属于边缘组织。

(2)Shapiro, The Terrorist■■s Dilemma:Managing Violent Covert Organizations, p.169.

(3)Teresa Whitfield, Endgame for ETA:Elusive Peace in the Basque Country,Oxford, UK:Oxford University Press, 2014, p.1.

(4)James D.Fearon,“Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, pp.275-301.

(5)来自爱尔兰驻华大使李修文,见隋菁菁、王晓真:《文化进取与包容:现代爱尔兰崛起之路——访爱尔兰驻华大使李修文》,载《中国社会科学报》,2018年10月11日,https://www.cssn.cn/dfpd/dh/202506/t20250619_5882261.shtml,访问时间:2024年10月9日。另参见Richard English, Armed Struggle:The History of the IRA,Oxford, UK:Oxford University Press, 2003, p.316和Brendan O■■Brien, The Long War:The IRA and Sinn Féin, Dublin, Ireland:The O■■Brien Press Ltd., 1999, p.389.

(1)Luis De La Calle and Ignacio S■■nchez-Cuenca,“Killing and Voting in the Basque Country:An Exploration of the Electoral Link Between ETA and Its Political Branch,”Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.25, No.1, 2013, pp.94-112.

(1)Evan S.Lieberman,“Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.3, 2005, pp.435-452; Bent Flyvbjerg,“Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry,Vol.12, No.2, 2006, pp.219-245.

(2)Lars-Erik Cederman, K.S.Gleditsch and H.Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances,and Civil War, 2013.

(3)Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman and International Peace Academy, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict:Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.

(1)Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and M?ns S?derbom,“On the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.41, No.3, 2004, pp.253-273.

(2)Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates and P?ivi Lujala,“Geography, Rebel Capability,and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.53, No.4,2009, pp.544-569; Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, pp.663-695.

(3)Cederman et al., Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis.

(4)Daniel Treisman,“Explaining Fiscal Decentralisation:Geography, Colonial History, Economic Development and Political Institutions,” Commonwealth&Comparative Politics, Vol.44, No.3, 2006, pp.289-325.

(5)Fearon, Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?; Walter,Building Reputation; Chaim Kaufmann,“Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security, Vol.20, No.4, 1996, pp.136-175.

(6)Julian Wucherpfennig, Nils W.Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,“Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War,” World Politics,Vol.64, No.1, 2012, pp.79-115.

(7)Snyder, From Voting to Violence.

(1)Seymour et al., E pluribus unum, ex uno plures; Schubiger, One for All?

(2)Barbara F.Walter, Committing to Peace:The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars,Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2002; Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time:CeaseFire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2004.

(1)例如Jason Lyall, Divided Armies:Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2020, pp.26-33, p.328;Daniel C.Mattingly, The Art of Political Control in China, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2020; Elizabeth R.Nugent, After Repression:How Polarization Derails Democratic Transition, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2020.

(2)Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods:Foundations and Guidelines, Ann Arbor, MI:University of Michigan Press, 2013.

(3)Nicholas Sambanis,“Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol.2, No.2, 2004, pp.259-279.

(4)卢凌宇、古宝密:《怨恨、机会,还是战略互动?——国内冲突起因研究述评》,载《国际观察》,2019年第2期,第89—115页。

(5)Jason Lyall,“Process Tracing, Causal Inference, and Civil War,” in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T.Checkel, eds., Process Tracing:From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp.186-207.

(6)James Mahoney,“The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,”Sociological Methods&Research, Vol.41, No.4, 2012, pp.570-597.

(7)Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman,“Qualitative Research:Recent Developments in Case Study Methods,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.9, 2006, pp.455-476; Alexander L.George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 2005; Mahoney, The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.汪卫华:《拆解过程追踪》,载《国际政治科学》,2022年第2期,第156—178页。

(1)John Gerring and Rose Mc Drmotte ,“An Experimental Template for Case Study Research,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.51, No.3, 2007, pp.688-701;John Gerring,“What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” American Political Science Review, Vol.98, No.2, 2004, pp.341-354.

(2)Pablo Beramendi and Ramón M■■iz,“Spain:Unfulfilled Federalism(1978—1996),” in Ugo M.Amoretti and Nancy Gina Bermeo, eds., Federalism and Territorial Cleavages, Baltimore, MD:Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.

(1)Whitfield, Endgame for ETA:Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, p.50.

(2)Juan Díez Medrano and Paula Gutiérrez,“Nested Identities:National and European Identity in Spain,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.24, No.5, 2001, pp.753-778.

(3)Ignacio S■■nchez-Cuenca,“The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism:ETA and the IRA,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.19, No.3, 2007, pp.289-306.

(4)Euskadi Ta Askatasuna(ETA), Documentos:Y(Vols.15-16), San Sebasti■■n:Hordago, 1980, p.336,转引自Philippe Eugéne Duhart,“From Armed Group to Movement:Armed Struggle and Movement Formation in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country,” Social Movement Studies, Vol.16, No.5, 2017, pp.535-548.

(1)Diego Muro, Ethnicity and Violence:The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism,New York, NY:Routledge, 2013.

(2)Gaizka Fern■■ndez Soldevilla,“Séptimos, Octavos y Milikis:Los Finales de ETA Político Mlitari(1981—1985),” Spagna Contemporanea, Vol.39, 2011, pp.51-73.

(3)政军埃塔宣布解散日期见30 a?os de la disolución de ETA pm, September 30,2012, https://www.eitb.eus/es/noticias/politica/detalle/960982/30-anos-disolucion-etapm--30-aniversario-disolucion-eta-pm/,访问时间:2023年12月6日。

(4)数据来源为全球恐怖主义数据库(https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/GTD)。

(1)Beramendi and M■■iz, Spain:Unfulfilled Federalism(1978—1996); Luis Moreno,“Divided Societies:Electoral Polarisation and the Basque Country,” in Adrian Guelke ed., Democracy and Ethnic Conflict:Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies, New York, NY:Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.35; Imanol Murua, Ending ETA■■s Armed Campaign:How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence, London, UK:Routledge, 2017, p.18-24.

(2)对Eugenio Etxebest的访谈,参见Imanol Murua, Ending ETA■■s Armed Campaign:How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence, London:Routledge, 2017, p.142.(3)《阿诺埃提议》的原文可参见Aiartza Urko and Zabalo Julen,“The Basque Country:The Long Walk to a Democratic Scenario,” in Berghof Transition Series 7,Berlin:Berghof Foundation, 2010, pp. 59-65.参见网址https://berghof-foundation.org/library/the-basque-country-the-longwalk-to-a-democratic-scenario,访问时间:2023年12月6日。

(4)Francisco Letamendia, Historia del naciona lismo vasco y de ETA:ETA y el Gobierno del PSOE(1982—1992), San Sebastian:R&B Ediciones, 1994, p.18.

(5)对I?aki Esnaola, Txema Montero的访谈,参见Murua, Ending ETA■■s Armed Campaign:How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence.

(1)Teresa Whitfield,“The Basque Conflict and ETA:The Difficulties of an Ending” United States Institute of Peace(www.usip.org), 2015, pp.1-16.

(2)关于中央政府的少数政府困境如何影响其对地方分离势力的态度,参见刘力达:《多源流模型下政党政治视阈中的地方分权政策制定机制——以苏格兰地区分离为例》,载《世界民族》,2023年第1期,第57—73页。

(3)Iker Casanova, ETA , 1958—2008:Medio Siglo de Historia, Tafalla:Txalaparta,2007.

(4)分别为埃塔的军事负责人弗朗西斯科·穆希卡·加门迪(Francisco Mujika Garmendi)、政治负责人何塞·路易斯·阿尔瓦雷斯·桑塔克里斯蒂纳(JoséLuisálvarez Santacristina)和后勤负责人何塞巴·阿雷吉·埃罗斯塔韦(Joseba Arregi Erostarbe)。

(1)Declaración de Euskadi Ta Askatasuna al Pueblo Vasco, December 3, 1999,https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ETA-declaration-Spanish.pdf,访问时间:2023年12月6日。

(2)人民团结党(HB)1998年改名为巴斯克公民党(EH),其更名变化具体可见图1说明部分关于巴斯克激进派政治翼的注释。

(3)JoséMaría Aznar, Eight Years as Prime Minister:A Personal View of Spain.Barcelona:Planeta, 2004, p.138.

(1)Whitfield, The Basque Conflict and ETA:The Difficulties of an Ending,pp.127-132.

(2)Jésus M.Eguiguren and Luis Rodriguez Aizpeolea, ETA, Las Claves de La Paz:Confesiones Del Negociador, Madrid:Aguilar, 2011.

(1)Fermín Munarriz.El tiempo de las luces:Entrevista con Arnaldo Otegi.Donostia:Gara, 2012, pp.58-59.

(2)对奥特奇的访谈,Imanol Murua Uria, Loiolako Heiak, Donostia:Elkar-Berria,2010, p.53,转引自Murua, Ending ETA■■s Armed Campaign:How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence.

(3)对奥特奇的访谈,引自Whitfield, Endgame for ETA:Elusive Peace in the Basque Country, p.164.

(4)Eguiguren and Rodriguez Aizpeolea, ETA , las claves de la paz, p.212, p.254.

(5)Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, La Agonía de ETA:Una Investigación Inédita Sobre Losúltimos Días de La Banda, Madrid:La Esfera de los Libros, 2012, pp.93-119.

(1)Domínguez Iribarren, La agonía de ETA, p.254-259.

(2)ETA, ETAren agiria Euskal Herriari, July 2011,转引自Julen Zabalo and Mikel Saratxo,“ETA Ceasefire:Armed Struggle vs.Political Practice in Basque Nationalism,”Ethnicities, Vol.15, No.3, 2015, pp.362-384.

(1)尽管新芬党的领导人在公开场合否认他们与共和军的直接联系,但外界广泛知晓他们同时也在共和军的军委中。参见Shapiro, The Terrorist■■s Dilemma:Managing Violent Covert Organizations.

(1)Brendan O■■Brien, The Long War:The IRA and Sinn Féin, p.169.

(2)Andrew Mumford,“Covert Peacemaking:Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the Early‘Troubles’, 1972—76,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.39, No.4, 2011, pp.633-648;Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA, New York, NY:Macmillan, 2000, pp.393-394.

(3)William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs, London, UK:Aurum, 1989,p.100.

(4)Sean Mac Siof■■int , Memoirs of a Revolutionary, Edinburgh, UK:Gordon Cremonesi, 1975, p.281.

(1)Krause, Rebel Power, p.156.

(2)English, Armed Struggle:The History of the IRA, p.111.

(3)The Sunningdale Agreement(1973), Tripartite Agreement on the Council of Ireland, CAIN, https://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm,访问时间:2023年12月6日。

(1)Andrew Mumford,“Covert Peacemaking:Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the Early‘Troubles’, 1972—76,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.39, No.4, 2011, pp.633-648.

(2)Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister:The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, London, UK:Jonathan Cape, 1987, p.130.

(3)Andrew Sanders, Inside the IRA:Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy, Edinburgh, UK:Edinburgh University Press, 2011.

(4)O■■Brien, The Long War, pp.109-110.

(5)Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, New York, NY:W.W.Norton&Company, 2003, p.157-160.

(6)Peter Krause对爱尔兰民族主义运动各方人士乔·多尔蒂(Joe Doherty)、吉姆·吉布尼(Jim Gibney)、哈里·多纳希(Harry Donaghy)、丹尼斯·霍伊(Denis Haughey)的访谈,见Krause, Rebel Power, p.155, p.162.

(1)Jonathan Stevenson,“Northern Ireland:Treating Terrorists as Statesmen,”Foreign Policy, No.105, 1996, pp.125-140.

(2)Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process:Ending the Troubles? Dublin, Ireland:Gill&Macmillan, 2000, p.70.

(3)Philippe Eugène Duhart,“Directing Disengagement Movement:Centralization,Coordination, and Credibility in the Irish and Basque Peace Processes Abstract,”European Journal of Sociology, Vol.57, No.1, 2016, pp.31-63.

(4)Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Féin:1985—2006, Liverpool, UK:Liverpool University Press, 2007, p.117.

(1)笔者对共和军成员的访谈,2020年9月29日,美国纽黑文(New Haven)。

(2)John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher Volume Two:The Iron Lady, London,UK:Vintage Books, 2008, pp.428-429.

(3)Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, New York, NY:Harper Collins,1993, p.385.

(4)John Newsinger,“From Counter-insurgency to Internal Security:Northern Ireland 1969—1992,” Small Wars&Insurgencies, Vol.6, No.1, 1995, pp.88-111.

(1)Gerry Adams, A Pathway to Peace, Cork:Mercier Press, 1988, p.74.

(2)对北爱事务大臣帕特里克·梅休(Patrick Mayhew)的访谈,引自Eamonn Mallie and David Mc Kttricki , Endgame in Ireland, Hachette, UK:Hodder&Stoughton, 2001, p.78.

(3)Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, p.70.

(4)Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p.249.

(5)Mallie and Mc Kttricki , Endgame in Ireland, p.164.

(1)Conflict Archive on the Internet(CAIN), The Framework Documents,February 22,1995, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/fd22295.htm,访问时间:2024年2月1日。

(2)CAIN, Irish Peace Process—Chronology of Key Events, 1993—1998, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9398.htm,访问时间:2024年2月1日。

(3)CAIN, The Agreement—Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations,April 10, 1988, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm,访问时间:2023年12月15日。

(1)John Mc Grra y and Brendan O■■Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict:Consociational Engagements, New York, NY:Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.260-293.

(2)Arend Lijphart,“The Framework Document on Northern Ireland and the Theory of Power-sharing,” Government and Opposition, Vol.31, No.3, 1996, pp.267-274.

(1)刘力达:《法国民族国家建构中的科西嘉问题及其治理困境》,载《中央民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2025年第2期,第72—84页。